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According to certain kinds of semantic dispositionalism, what an
agent means by her words is grounded by her dispositions to complete
simple tasks. This sort of position is often thought to avoid the finitude
problem raised by Kripke against simpler forms of dispositionalism.
The traditional objection is that, since words possess indefinite (or
infinite) extensions, and our dispositions to use words are only finite,
those dispositions prove inadequate to serve as ground for what we
mean by our words. I argue that, even if such positions (emphasizing
simple tasks) avoid the traditional form of Kripke’s charge, they still
succumb to special cases of the finitude problem. Furthermore, I show
how such positions can be augmented so as to avoid even these special
cases. Doing so requires qualifying the dispositions of interest as those
possessed by the abstracted version of an actual agent (in contrast to,
say, an idealized version of the agent). In addition to avoiding the
finitude problem in its various forms, the position that results provides
new materials for appreciating the role that abstracting models can
play for a dispositionalist theory of meaning.
1 Introduction
According to semantic dispositionalism, the meanings of the terms an agent
uses are determined by some of her dispositions, such as those of a recogni-
tional, discriminatory, or inferential variety. As part of his case for meaning
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scepticism, Saul Kripke (1982) offers several criticisms of this kind of posi-
tion. Among them is what will be called the finitude problem: while terms
possess indefinite (or even infinite) extensions, agents like us possess only
finite dispositions. So we cannot, contrary to the ambitions of the semantic
dispositionalist, ground the intended meaning of terms on the basis of such
dispositions.1
In reaction to this problem, Simon Blackburn (1984) and Neil Tennant
(1997) (building on a suggestion by Jon Cogburn) have denied that we should
appeal to the total dispositional state of an agent in order to settle what she
means by her words.2 Rather, they suggest that a finite agent’s ability to
indefinitely apply a term is best explained by appeal to her dispositions
to complete simple, entirely surveyable tasks. Here, I argue (in §4.1 and
§4.2) that, despite the appeal of this position, it still faces special cases
of the finitude problem. Furthermore, I show how the use of abstracting
models can remedy these problems. As Nicholaos Jones and I originally
argued, the traditional finitude problem can be solved by appealing to the
dispositions possessed by the abstracted version of an agent, where the limits
on the traits responsible for our finite nature are ignored in a principled
fashion (Podlaskowski and Jones, 2012). I adapt a similar strategy here
to the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach (in §5, §5.2, §5.3, and §5.4),
allowing us to keep some of what is promising about the approach.
Of course, the initial appeal of the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach
is its promise to resolve the finitude problem. So, it is reasonable to wonder
whether the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach retains any of that ap-
peal if it must rely on abstracting models in order to avoid special cases
of the finitude problem. To address this concern, it is established that
the Podlaskowski-Jones approach also benefits from its merging with the
Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach; as such, the latter approach takes on
a new significance, still in relation to the finitude problem. More specifically,
while the case that Jones and I originally made for the use of abstracting
models was in reaction to one of Kripke’s charges against the use of ideal-
izing models, Kripke raised an additional charge that we did not explicitly
1This problem is generalizable to any attempt to (metaphysically) reduce meaning to
naturalistically respectable materials (including physical states, capacities, or abilities, all
of which might be finite). Solutions (to the finitude problem for physical states, capacities,
or abilities) can be offered analogous to those addressed in this article.
2Though Tennant developed the position in some detail, he credits Cogburn with orig-
inally suggesting the strategy (1997, 153, note 6).
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address. A version of that charge, adapted to the use of abstractions, is
raised (in §6, §6.1, and §6.2); and it is shown, by citing the dispositions em-
phasized in the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach, that an apt reply is
made available.
In short, this essay is an exercise in symbiosis, executed on behalf of
two forms of semantic dispositionalism. As a preliminary step to making
this case, a basic characterization is given (in the next section) of meaning
skepticism and the finitude problem facing semantic dispositionalism.
2 The traditional finitude problem
With the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein, Kripke (1982)
threatens many theories of meaning, including semantic dispositionalism. To
illustrate the challenge, consider an agent’s use of the symbol ‘+’. Suppose
she were asked to answer ‘25+200=?’. If she meant addition by ‘+’, she
should answer ‘225’. The meaning sceptic, though, demands that we cite
the fact about this agent in virtue of which she means (or meant) addition
instead of some other function, e.g., quaddition, where one has successfully
quadded just in case, if both of the numbers (presented) are less than 57, one
should produce their sum; and if either of the numbers (presented) is greater
than or equal to 57, one should answer ‘5’. The semantic dispositionalist
answers the meaning sceptic by appealing to an agent’s dispositions to use
the symbol ‘+’. According to one version of the thesis, that an agent means
addition by the use of the symbol ‘+’ is owing to her being disposed, under
conditions that are normal, standard, or favorable, to answer ‘225’ to the
question ‘25+200=?’ and to give answers indicative of addition for all other
pairs of numbers.3
This sort of answer to the meaning sceptic presents a problem: although
3The appeal to standard, optimal, or favorable conditions is an attempt to differentiate
between those dispositions that ground correct uses of expressions from those that ground
incorrect uses. It has been argued, however, that any such appeal must be viciously
circular. For related arguments, see Boghossian (1989, 537-540) and Fodor (1990, 59-
82). For a reply to Boghossian’s (1989) objection from semantic holism, see Podlaskowski
(2010). And for an argument that semantic holism actually aids the opponent of the
meaning sceptic, see Tennant (1997, 108-15). For more general defenses of the appeal
to conditions of the, e.g., standard, favorable, or optimal variety, see Miller (1997) and
Pettit (1999). As to whether this sort of strategy—or another one—allows for successfully
distinguishes between correct and incorrect uses of terms is not an immediate concern.
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there are infinitely many numbers that might be added together, ordinary
agents are not disposed to do so for any two numbers, because most num-
bers are too large for ordinary agents to process. This point generalizes
easily: whereas any term can be applied correctly an indefinite (or even in-
finite) number of times, the dispositions of an agent like us are only finite.
The correct application of any given term outpaces the dispositions of finite
agents like us, therefore rendering those dispositions inadequate for reading
an agent’s intended meaning off her dispositions. Again, call this the finitude
problem for semantic dispositionalism.
3 Simple tasks and semantic dispositionalism
In reaction to the finitude problem, Tennant identifies and rejects an assump-
tion made by the meaning sceptic as unduly strong:
Why should one accept the implicit assumption that the dispo-
sitionalist is committed to having the subject be able to carry
out every command to add two numbers, no matter how large?
Clearly, this is too extravagant a demand. Why not rather say
that the way to check a subject’s ‘correct’ dispositions with regard
to addition is to present him with any (stretch of) a computation
of the sum of two numbers, and then, with respect to any sur-
veyable aspect of such a computation, ask him whether it is in
order? (1997, 138)
In place of the meaning sceptic’s presumption that we appeal to the total
dispositional state of an agent to use a particular expression, Tennant sug-
gests that an agent need only possess the factorizable dispositions to handle
a localized segment of a calculation or proof (1997, 139).4
To illustrate these dispositions, consider the following fragment of an
addition problem:
1
. . . 6 7 . . .
+ . . . 1 5 . . .
. . . 8 2 . . .
4Though Tennant’s (1997) point is part of a larger semantic anti-realist framework, it
has intuitive appeal independent of that project.
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So long as one can add together ‘7’ and ‘5’, carry the ‘1’, and add together
‘6’, ‘1’, and the carried over ‘1’—without regard to the particular place that
these columns occupy within the larger addition problem—we can say the
relevant competencies are in place. Competence with this method depends
on one’s disposition to handle any given column of an addition problem in
decimal notation, as well as how these basic tasks are combined. For instance,
such an agent is disposed to carry numbers from one column to another, to
recognize which side of the problem with which to begin one’s calculations
(e.g., the right side in the right-to-left method), and to recognize what counts
as the terminating point of a calculation (e.g., in the right-to-left method,
when we run out of numbers to add together on the left side of the problem).
That the finitude problem is avoided depends on emphasizing that mean-
ing is fixed by an agent’s factorizable dispositions left unthreatened by the
meaning sceptic’s attacks. With something as simple as the disposition to
consult a look-up table for the addition of single digits, the number of avail-
able possibilities does not serve the meaning sceptic’s purposes. After all, the
finitude problem is motivated by raising possible uses of a term beyond one’s
finite capabilities; however, on the present approach, the relevant possibilities
appear constrained to dispositions to use a completely surveyable look-up ta-
ble. We can appeal to these dispositions as the metaphorical building blocks
(hence “factorizable”) from which any application of a term is constituted;
the determinacy enjoyed by our factorizable dispositions is transferred to
more complex configurations of those dispositions.
A similar reply to the finitude problem is offered by Blackburn, who
suggests that one’s intending to mean addition by ‘+’ is established by the
fact that, for a question such as ‘x+y=?’:
The answer I would accept is the one that would be given by
reiterating procedures I am disposed to use a number of times. . . .
The equation would be: By ‘+’, I mean that function F, that
accords with my extended dispositions if and only if (i) it is the
answer I am disposed to give and retain after investigation, or
(ii) it is the answer I would accept if I repeated a number of
times procedures I am disposed to use, this being independent of
whether I am disposed to repeat those procedures that number
of times. (1984, 289-290)
We might read Blackburn’s description of one’s extended dispositions as re-
lying on a distinction between one’s disposition to use a procedure and the
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opportunities to manifest that disposition at different times and in differ-
ent numbers of repetitions.5 The indefinitely many applications of a term
derive, in part, from the indefinitely many occasions for manifesting the rel-
evant dispositions. As such, the emphasis on one’s extended dispositions,
along with the fact that there are indefinitely many situations in which they
might manifest, is meant to show that one’s finite dispositions do not engen-
der the finitude problem, as Kripke insists. Much as for Tennant’s account,
Blackburn maintains that the dispositions to complete simple tasks which
actual agents possess—properly understood—provide the basis for avoiding
the traditional form of the finitude problem.6
4 Special cases of the finitude problem
Though an attractive position, the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach is
not without problems. As argued in the next two sections (§4.1 and §4.2),
the position is subject to two special cases of the finitude problem.
4.1 The combination problem
First, there is what will be called the combination problem. The problem
arises because the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach emphasizes both
dispositions to complete simple tasks and dispositions to coordinate, order, or
combine those simple tasks in the right way. While both sorts of dispositions
5This interpretation is similar to the one given by Jussi Haukioja (2004). Blackburn’s
position, so understood, resembles somewhat the account provided by Martin and Heil
(1998, 297-304), who argue that a disposition should not be confused with the opportu-
nities for its manifestation; though a being might possess a disposition which is finitely
manifestable, this does not mean that the disposition itself is finite.
6While the discussion has been restricted to examples of logical and mathematical
terms, it is worth considering if these solutions apply to any sort of term. Settling the
matter depends on the details of the positions. Tennant (1997) is well placed to provide
a general account, for he applies his point about factorizable dispositions to the rules
operative in any fragment of a proof, and argues that such rules provide the basis for a
general account of meaning. Whether Blackburn’s approach (1984) can be generalized
to any sort of term has not been demonstrated. However, there is no obvious obstacle
to doing so. But if the account fails to apply to every sort of expression, Blackburn’s
account is not alone, for as Mark Sprevak observes (2008, 285-6), many notable solutions
to meaning scepticism also apply only to restricted classes of expressions.
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are factorizable, it is doubtful (given our finite limits) that we possess the
latter dispositions to the extent required to fix what we mean by our words.
In order to state the combination problem for the case of addition, first
consider the sorts of dispositions targeted. When using the right-to-left
method of adding, one should (for instance) handle each column in the same
fashion, moving from one column to the next left adjacent column in the fash-
ion prescribed by the method. One should start with the right-most column
first, and one may not whimsically jump around from column-to-column.
Call these sorts of dispositions combinatory dispositions. Now consider an
addition problem involving too many columns to be solved in one’s lifetime—
a case involving many iterations of the same combinatory dispositions. Even
if we are disposed to provide the relevant sum for each column handled, and
then continue to the left adjacent column, we have our limits: we can only
complete the same simple task in a particular order so many times. This
proves problematic because adding requires handing columns in a particular
order; and so our inability to handle each column in the appropriate order
invites indeterminacy regarding our use of ‘+’.
Keeping with the emphasis on factorizable dispositions, it is tempting to
say that we possess the same disposition to move from the tenth column to
the eleventh column of an addition problem as we do moving from the one-
trillionth column of an addition problem. This temptation should be resisted,
though, as such a picture remains insensitive to the fact that, as adders, we
ought to proceed in a particular order—a fact that surely affects how we
characterize the relevant dispositions. To better see this, imagine the diffi-
culties one would face trying to coordinate one’s activities (producing sums
within columns) when faced with solving an addition problem involving, say,
ten columns, were one’s attention to wander from moment-to-moment and
one possessed next to no working memory. The result would be someone
who is arithmetically adrift: though perhaps capable of producing the sum
for the numbers in any given column, such an unfortunate figure would have
no assurance of coordinating one’s activities in the manner of adding. By
magnifying that situation to the case of an addition problem involving an
enormous number of columns, the claim that we possess the required com-
binatory dispositions for any given column in any given addition problem
becomes highly dubious. So, contrary to Tennant’s insistence that compe-
tence with addition involves the disposition to handle any arbitrary column
of an addition problem, competence with addition involves the disposition
to handle columns in a particular order. Despite possessing the relevant fac-
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torizable dispositions, then, our finite limits block possessing them for any
given column in the order required by addition. Hence, the meaning sceptic
gains a new foothold.
4.2 The input problem
The second problem facing the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach is what
will be called the input problem. The problem is that there are terms whose
applications cannot be broken down into tasks involving manageable inputs
of the sort required by the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach.
This concern does not arise for every term. For the approach’s favored
case of addition, the sorts of factorizable dispositions to which Tennant and
Cogburn appeal are well-suited (combination problem, aside). The same can-
not be said, however, for the factorizable dispositions fixing that, by the word
‘and’, we mean the conjunction operator found in a natural deduction sys-
tem.7 To help see this, suppose that one’s grasp of conjunction is determined
by one’s grasp of the corresponding introduction rule (“From a sentence p
and a sentence q, we may infer p and q”) and elimination rule (“From a
sentence p and q, we may infer p, as well as q”). Notice also that the set of
proofs featuring those rules is infinite, that the proofs themselves can be of
any finite length, and that those proofs get larger (in two dimensions) as the
sentences themselves get longer. This proves problematic because the use
of an introduction or elimination rule on some enormously long conjunction
involves at least one enormously long conjunct, and there is no way to factor
out anything sufficiently small for a finite agent like us to manage. That is,
there are enormously long sentences for which we lack the memory, lifespan,
etc. needed in order to conjoin it with any other sentence in the manner of
the conjunction introduction rule; and for a conjunction including an enor-
mously long conjunct, we lack the memory, lifespan, etc. required to apply
the elimination rule. So, appealing to an agent’s dispositions to complete
simple tasks fails to ground any given use of the word ‘and’. While there
is clearly a procedure in place for deciding whether those rules have been
applied correctly or incorrectly, the problem is that our finite dispositions
cannot determine that we use that procedure since not every application
7It is natural to choose operators in a natural deduction system, given Tennant’s project
of taking Gentzen-style introduction and elimination rules as the basis for a general account
of meaning. If one’s position on the meaning of logical operators prohibits a proof-theoretic
treatment, though, other terms are surely available to illustrate the point.
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of that procedure involves inputs of a size that agents like us can handle.
Therefore, the meaning sceptic gains yet another foothold.
5 Abstractions and semantic dispositionalism
That the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach, unadorned, succumbs to
the combination problem and the input problem is troubling because the
position expresses an insight worth preserving: that an agent’s competence
with terms is grounded in dispositions to complete feasible tasks. In §5.1,
a seemingly natural attempt to save the position—one invoking idealizing
models—is entertained and ultimately rejected. And starting in §5.2, a more
promising solution is offered: by invoking abstracting models, we can (on
principled grounds) ignore the traits responsible for an agent’s finite limits.
5.1 Invoking idealizing models
Consider the following reply to the combination problem and the input prob-
lem, couched in terms of the Tennant-Cogburn position. Though this brand
of semantic dispositionalist grounds the meanings of one’s words by appeal
to an ordinary agent’s factorizable dispositions to complete simple tasks, so
the reply goes, a certain amount of idealization is also required.8 Idealizing
models impute to a system some trait that it does not actually possess, and
in the case of a finite agent, we should expect to idealize away from those
traits responsible for her finite limits.9 Applied to the combination problem,
though an actual agent does not have the traits responsible for possessing
all of the combinatory dispositions indicative of adding, an idealized version
of the agent, with an unlimited lifespan, memory, and attention span is not
similarly hampered. And as for the input problem, while an actual (finite)
8Tennant does, in fact, make use of idealizations in a related context (1997, 143-150).
He does not, however, bring it directly to bear on the problem of immediate interest.
9In a certain respect, this approach, employed in reaction to the finitude problem, fits
well with the practices of linguists. As Chomsky puts it, “Linguistic theory is concerned
primarily with an ideal speaker-listener... who knows her language perfectly and is un-
affected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory conditions, distractions,
shifts of attention and interest, and errors.” (1965, 3). Though not the immediate aim of
this article, it is worth entertaining how the case made in this article might impact the
starting point for linguistics. To that end, see also Cogburn’s (2004) reassessment of the
significance of behavioral dispositions for current debates in linguistics.
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agent cannot ever hope to handle enormous inputs involved in the applica-
tions of some terms, the same need not be said for an appropriately idealized
version of the agent.
These replies suffer, however, from the same fatal flaw as any appeal
to idealizing models on behalf of the semantic dispositionalist, what will be
called the multiplicity problem. The traditional form of the concern is that
there are multiple ways to idealize the traits of an actual agent, and the only
way to privilege one of those idealized versions as the one that fixes what the
actual agent means by her words is to assume that which we aim to establish:
namely, that she intends addition (rather than quaddition) by ‘+’. Hence,
the semantic dispositionalist’s appeal to idealizations is viciously circular.10
Since the multiplicity problem applies to any given trait, it is plain that the
situation is no different when idealizing those traits that limit one’s ability to
combine simple tasks and those traits that limit one’s ability to handle inputs
because of their size. As such, an appeal to idealizing models does not aid
this brand of semantic dispositionalism in answering either the combination
problem or the input problem.
5.2 Invoking abstracting models
In the next several sections, an alternative reply to the combination problem
and the input problem is advanced, building on the case that Jones and I
made for the use of abstracting models in defense of semantic dispositionalism
(Podlaskowski and Jones, 2012).
To strike the principal contrast between abstracting and idealizing mod-
els, consider first the distinction made by Frederick Suppe (1989) between
physical parameters and physical quantities: whereas physical parameters
are kinds of traits that entities or objects might possess (e.g., mass), physi-
cal quantities are amounts of physical parameters (e.g., 412 grams of mass).11
Against this backdrop, abstracting from a physical system is understood, for
some physical parameter, as not assigning it any physical quantity whatso-
ever (or, equivalently, not including the parameter in the model at all)—in
short, to ignore the parameter altogether. For example, an abstraction from
10See Kripke (1982, 28) and Kusch (2005, 163) for related formulations of this objection
to the use of idealizations.
11Similar distinctions between idealizing and abstracting are prominent in the literature,
including those provided by Cartwright (1989), Chakravartty (2001), Ducheyne (2007),
Jones (2008), Liu (1999), and Suppe (1989).
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an actual pendulum might fail to include mention altogether of the actual
temperature of pendulum. The reason for doing so, of course, is that the
temperature of the pendulum is irrelevant to its behavior qua pendulum. In
contrast, idealizing a physical system is a matter of replacing some physical
quantity in that system with a quantity that the system does not actually
have. For instance, one way (among many) of idealizing a pendulum is to
replace the physical quantity characterizing the finite extension of its bob
with a value of zero. In short, what distinguishes abstracting from idealizing
models is how physical quantities are handled.
Jones and I have argued that abstracting models better serve the semantic
dispositionalist than idealizing models. According to this approach, that
an actual (finite) agent means addition by ‘+’ is fixed by appeal to the
dispositions (to add) of an abstracted version of the agent who does not suffer
from the same finite limits as the actual agent. This approach resembles the
use of idealizations insofar as the finitude problem is dodged by appealing to
a model (of the agent) who is not similarly limited. The two sorts of models
differ, though, in that the problem for invoking idealizations begins with
there being too many idealizations from which to choose (the multiplicity
problem); but with abstractions, no such problem arises. That is, though
there are many physical quantities that can replace the one possessed by
an actual agent (in an idealizing model), there is only one way to ignore
such a quantity (in an abstracting model). Where the physical parameters
are traits responsible for our finite limits, abstracting away from those traits
can only be achieved in one way, yielding one model. So, the semantic
dispositionalist can avoid the finitude problem by abstracting away from
those traits responsible for an agent’s finite limits (much as for idealizations),
and do so without facing the same charge of circular reasoning.
This is not to say, however, that the abstracted version of an agent pos-
sesses all of the same dispositions as the actual agent—just those grounding
one’s competence with a term (what will be called competence-constituting
dispositions). More specifically, Jones and I have invoked a distinction be-
tween those traits that contribute to one’s competence with a term and
those traits that contribute to one’s performance in its use (Podlaskowski
and Jones, 2012, 174-175). The idea is that, because the appeal of abstract-
ing models is to establish the dispositions in virtue of which an actual agent
is competent with a term, only traits relevant to said competence should be
included in the model. Since the traits responsible for our finite nature (such
as our memory capacities) do not appear to be relevant to our possession of
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competence-constituting dispositions—but rather contribute to an account
of our performance in using terms—those traits should not be included in
the model. As for deciding which traits should be ignored, it is assumed here
that the matter is amenable to empirical investigation, where scientists can
distinguish in a principled way between traits relevant to one’s competence
with any given term without presupposing the meaning of any particular
one.12
The use of abstracting models makes for a natural fit with the Blackburn-
Tennant-Cogburn approach, especially given that such an approach also fo-
cuses on those dispositions relevant to one’s competence with words.13 On
such a merged view, what is important for fixing that an actual agent means
addition by ‘+’ is there being an abstracted version of the agent who pos-
sesses the same factorizable competence-constituting dispositions as the ac-
tual agent. As for the traits responsible for the special cases of the finitude
problem (addressed in more detail in §5.3 and §5.4), the corresponding phys-
ical parameters are not assigned quantities—we ignore them, since they are
irrelevant to one’s competence with words.
Notice, though, that abstracting away from traits relevant only to one’s
performance in using a term (such as memory capacity) does not entail that
the abstracted agent does not possess those traits altogether. Failure to
appreciate this point rests on a confusion between abstractions and idealiza-
tions: ignoring some physical quantity is not the same thing as (idealizing
and hence) replacing the value assigned to the parameter with a quantity
of zero (or any other quantity, for that matter). For example, classical me-
chanical methods of planetary motion ignore traits such as the particular
temperatures of planets, because one’s understanding of the system does not
require this additional information—but in doing so, no supposition is made
that planets fail to have any temperatures whatsoever. Similarly, rather than
12Jones and I have argued that, while idealizations have been criticized for how they
model traits, a parallel criticism does not arise for settling which traits to include a model
(Podlaskowski and Jones, 2012, 169). For the use of abstractions, concerns about inde-
terminacy arise neither for saying how to model a trait nor saying which traits to include
in a model (2012, 175-176). Also see our discussion of choosing which traits to include in
the model, based on empirical grounds (2012, 172 and 175-176).
13Tennant invokes a distinction between competence and performance using the nature
of computation as his principal guide (1997, 133-137). But while his position on factoriz-
able dispositions is compatible with invoking abstractions, it remains to be established that
abstractions prove compatible with Tennant’s full-fledged (semantic anti-realist) position.
For present purposes, we may remain agnostic on the matter.
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assign to the physical parameter of memory capacity a particular quantity
that the actual agent does not possess (as one would in an idealization),
an abstraction does not include any value whatsoever. Another (perhaps
less contentious) way to think about this is that, by not assigning a quan-
tity to such traits, we are abstracting away from the limits of those traits
(Podlaskowski and Jones, 2012, 175). Either way, the abstracting model,
in effect, provides a sense for what competence-constituting dispositions an
agent possesses.
In the next two sections, it is demonstrated how abstracting models fea-
ture in replies to the combination problem and input problem.
5.3 A reply to the combination problem
Recall the combination problem: our finite limits block our possessing combi-
natory dispositions to the extent required to fix what we mean by our words.
Dispelling this concern requires attending to the traits responsible for own
combinatory dispositions and how those dispositions fare in an abstracting
model. What the actual agent and the abstracted version have in common
are the traits relevant to their (factorizable) competence-constituting dispo-
sitions, which includes the combinatory ones; where they differ is that, in
the model, the traits irrelevant to those dispositions are ignored. Moreover,
the traits responsible for the limits on competence-constituting dispositions—
traits such as memory capacity and attention span—are most likely irrelevant
to semantic competence (as suggested in §5.2). As such, those traits deserve
to be ignored in the model of an agent; and so, in the model, the limits associ-
ated with those traits do not affect the competence-constituting dispositions
of the abstracted version of an agent. Hence, the dispositions—including the
combinatory variety—of the abstracted version of an agent are not limited
(by irrelevant and finite traits) so as to invite the combination problem.
That the agent in the model possesses the combinatory dispositions in-
dicative of addition—instead of some quaddition-like counterpart, credited
to the ingenuity of the reader—is settled by materials already in place.14
Key to establishing that the agent in the model (and by association, the ac-
tual agent) is disposed to add is that the relevant combinatory dispositions
14The mention of quaddition-like possibilities here is reminiscent of the concern raised
for fixing our meaning-constituting dispositions by appeal to those possessed by a machine
program (Kripke, 1982, 32-35). The account provided here for why agents are disposed to
add equally applies to this other objection.
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are factorizable, just like dispositions to produce a sum within any given
column of an addition problem. As such, the relevant combinatory dispo-
sitions constitute the basic sorts of coordinating tasks between columns in
the order indicative of addition. Accordingly, the agent in the model (for
whom the limits of the actual agent are ignored) is disposed to act in the
same way within any given column and in the same way (and order) moving
from column-to-column. That is, for an agent without limits, the specified
factorizable dispositions yield the set of dispositions indicative of addition.
To Blackburn’s position, Kusch raises an objection that resembles the
combination problem:
Blackburn’s argument makes the questionable assumption that
performing a calculation again and again will inevitably push me
towards the right result. Alas, there is no inevitability here at all.
It could well be the case that the reliability of the result decreases
as I check my result repeatedly. (2006, 113)
This objection takes a broader swipe at Blackburn’s position than just his
reply to the finitude problem. It also targets Blackburn’s reply to the com-
plaint that semantic dispositionalism cannot account for the possibility of
error.15 For present purposes, though, the focus remains on the finitude
problem.
Just as with the combination problem, invoking abstracting models proves
helpful. For even though an actual agent might exhibit different dispositions
as she repeatedly manipulates the same symbols (as Kusch suggests), the
abstracted version of an agent—for whom we have ignored the limit on traits
such as continuous attention span—does not obviously suffer from a similar
shift in dispositions. This is because the traits responsible for such a shift
(in Kusch’s example) just happen to be those ignored in the model (for
reasons cited in §5.2, above). After all, the traits to which Kusch alludes
(in his objection to Blackburn’s position) are those which are responsible for
agents like us possessing finite dispositions—the same traits that motivate
the finitude problem. In short, for an abstracted version of an agent, there is
no obvious concern that she might possess different dispositions depending
on the number of times that she manipulates a symbol.
15Paul Coates (1997) provides an interesting defense of a Blackburn-style approach to
this charge that semantic dispositionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of an agent
making mistakes.
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5.4 A reply to the input problem
Recall the input problem: there are terms (such as ‘and’) for which some
(or perhaps many) applications cannot be broken down into tasks involving
manageable inputs of the sort required by the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn
approach. Much as for the combination problem, invoking abstracting models
here proves to be invaluable. In the model of an agent, we ignore those
physical parameters of the actual agent that impose a restriction on the size
of the inputs involved in the application of any given term. The rationale
for doing so is that the traits motivating the input problem, like other traits
motivating the finitude problem (and its variations), are irrelevant to one’s
competence with a term and, therefore, deserve to be ignored in the model.
To illustrate this point, consider again the introduction and eliminations
rules for the conjunction operator and how the relevant traits fare in an
abstracting model. In the model, we are not imputing to an agent the dispo-
sition to handle conjuncts of enormous length (as we might in an idealizing
model). Instead, those traits pertaining to handling the length of conjuncts
(e.g., working memory, attention span) are ignored, since they are irrelevant
to one’s competence with the introduction and elimination rules. While Ten-
nant insists that we should only expect of an agent to complete any given
step of a proof, the appeal to abstracting models makes sense of agents doing
so even if those individual steps involve premises too long and not further
factorizable. This roughly matches up with the actual practice of completing
complicated proofs, in that for such cases, we regard the lengths of the sen-
tences involved to be irrelevant to the meaning of the conjunction operator.
To Tennant’s position, Kusch raises an objection that resembles the input
problem:
Tennant’s answer to the finitude problem is obviously unsatisfac-
tory. My dispositions to give sums in reply to plus-queries with
non-enormous numbers cannot show that I have dispositions to
give sums in reply to plus-queries with enormous numbers. (2006,
279, note 63)
On one reading of this objection, Kusch raises traditional doubts about finite
dispositions against Tennant’s position. So understood, the objection fails
to connect, because Tennant’s point is that we should reject the original
motivation for the traditional formulation of the problem. But on another
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reading of Kusch’s objection, where the concern resembles the input problem,
the objection deserves our attention.
We should expect, much as for the input problem, that Tennant can-
not help himself to idealizing models in order to dodge the charge. (Kusch
rightly denies Tennant such a move.) However, invoking abstracting models
is effective in countering this charge. The charge proceeds from the assump-
tion that we cannot establish one’s dispositions involving (e.g.) adding to-
gether enormous numbers on the basis of those dispositions to add together
non-enormous numbers. But by invoking an abstracting model, the traits
responsible for our limited ability to handle large inputs are ignored.
In summary, neither the combination problem nor the input problem is
a cause for concern, since the traits responsible for raising those problems
are irrelevant to what one means, and therefore deserve to be ignored when
constructing the appropriate abstracting model. The resultant position is
one according to which what an agent means by a term is established by the
factorizable dispositions possessed by the abstracted version of the agent.
6 An objection to using abstractions
The original case made for invoking abstracting models was in reaction to the
multiplicity problem. (The response to that problem, offered by Jones and
I, was briefly rehearsed in §5.2.) There is, however, an additional criticism
that Kripke raises against invoking idealizations which can be adapted to the
use of abstractions—one that is presented in §6.1, and for which a reply is
supplied in §6.2.
6.1 The ignorance problem
Kripke suggests that we do not possess the knowledge required for appreci-
ating what the world (or agents in it) would be like, if an idealizing model
(used in defense of semantic dispositionalism) were true. He asks: “How in
the world can I tell what would happen if my brain were stuffed with extra
brain matter...? ... We have no idea what the results of such experiments
would be” (1982, 27). As such, there is no clear sense for whether the ide-
alized version of an agent has the same (relevant) dispositions as the actual
agent. But if the idealized and actual agent fail to possess the same dispo-
sitions (of the relevant sort), there is no good reason to think, for example,
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that the actual agent means to add rather than quadd in virtue of whatever
dispositions the idealized version of the agent possesses.16
Much as for idealizing models, the worry might be raised that we have no
genuine sense for what the world (or agents in it) would be like, according to
the abstracted model where the traits responsible for our finite capacities are
ignored. As such, there is no good reason to conclude that the abstracted
version of the agent possesses the same dispositions as the actual agent.
Therefore, the grounds are lacking for the conclusion that the abstracted
version of the agent and the actual agent mean the same thing by their
words. Call this the ignorance problem for abstractions.17
6.2 A reply to the ignorance problem
The adapted objection, however, is not as convincing as the original one.
According to Kripke’s criticism, there is no guarantee that an actual agent
and a highly idealized one sufficiently resemble each other. If the compar-
ison between the actual agent and the agent in the model were conducted
according to their total dispositional states, the differences between them
would be apparent, lending further support to the ignorance problem. But
by abstracting away from factorizable dispositions, the resemblance between
an actual agent and her abstracted counterpart becomes obvious, for they
possess the same such dispositions. Indeed, in the case of an actual agent
and her abstracted version, they cannot differ in the factorizable dispositions
grounding their competence with terms. To appreciate this point, recall that,
while the pertinent abstracting model is designed to ignore those traits ir-
relevant to one’s factorizable (meaning-constituting) dispositions, the model
must also include mention of those traits relevant to those dispositions. So,
16For significant replies to Kripke’s objection, see Fodor (1990, 94-5) and Pietroski
and Rey (1995). See Kusch (2005) for a thoughtful response to Fodor’s case. And see
Kowalenko (2009) for a equally thoughtful response to Kusch’s case.
17An alternative reading of Kripke’s charge (1982, 27) is that the appeal to idealiza-
tions is at odds with the expectation that we can settle a priori what we mean by our
words. Whether this objection can be answered rests on providing an account of the
epistemology of meaning (with, perhaps, an emphasis on introspection) as it pertains to
the Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach augmented with the use of abstracting models.
Such an account falls well outside the scope of this essay. Still, if any version of semantic
dispositionalism proves compatible with a priori knowledge of what one means by their
words, a dual emphasis on factorizable dispositions and abstracting models might show a
great deal more promise than other varieties of dispositionalism.
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if one’s factorizable dispositions depend on possessing a certain set of traits,
and both the actual agent and the agent in the model possess those traits,
they both possess the corresponding factorizable dispositions. By design,
then, the agent in the model and the actual agent share the same factoriz-
able dispositions. Since those dispositions fix what one means by a term,
the abstracted version and the genuine article mean the same thing by their
words. So, contra the ignorance problem, even if we did not know entirely
what the world featured in the model would be like, we do have a clear sense
for the sorts of meaning-constituting dispositions that would be possessed by
the agent in the model.18
This response to the ignorance problem for abstractions assumes a great
deal about ourselves; establishing the resemblance between an actual agent
and her abstracted counterpart requires distinguishing between those traits
pertinent to one’s competence with a term and those pertinent to one’s per-
formance in its use—a point regularly stressed in §5.2, §5.3, and §5.4. The
concern might be raised, though, that we are not the sorts of beings to which
such a distinction can be applied. It might be the case that our brains are
structured according to an architecture where the traits pertinent to our us-
ing a term cannot be separated from those required for competence with the
term. Neural networks serve as an apt example, insofar the limits of memory
depend upon the number of nodes and their weights. Ignoring the limits on
memory here (in an abstracting model), therefore, requires ignoring some of
the features constitutive of the neural network. So, if our brains are best un-
derstood solely as a neural network, and if meaning-constituting dispositions
should be read-off the dispositions of one’s brain, it appears that the sought
after distinction between competence and performance cannot be applied.
There are empirical grounds, however, for applying this distinction to
beings like us. To cite one example, Robert Kowalenko (2009) draws this
conclusion based on a survey of recent empirical research on the topic of
mental mathematics (one bearing closely to Kripke’s concerns about addi-
tion). Essential to his case is research that suggests mental mathematics
involves several subsystems whose operation can be isolated from the sub-
systems responsible for, e.g., memory capacity. Insofar as the disposition to
18If more than one abstracting model of the traits relevant to our meaning-constituting
dispositions were available, there might still be doubts about the resemblance between
an agent and her abstracted counterpart: it would remain indeterminate whether the
resemblance holds. But as already argued by Jones and I (and reconstructed in §5.2),
abstracting models do not suffer from the multiplicity problem.
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add rests on the interaction between some of the former subsystems, grounds
are available for isolating our dispositions to add from other factors such as
memory capacity.19 To cite another example, Noam Chomsky takes a similar
distinction between competence and performance to be “fundamental” to the
study of modern linguistics (1965, 4). While Chomsky originally invoked the
distinction for his theory of syntax, it has since been adapted to the study
of semantics—e.g., Cresswell (1978), Larson and Segal (1995), and Chierchia
and McConnell-Ginet (2000).
The materials are in place, then, for pinpointing where the proposed coun-
terexample (featuring a neural network) goes wrong. Of course, the brain
is a biological neural network involving a number of different subsystems
belonging to a nervous system. But the sort of neural network advanced
in the example, above, fails to include details relevant to understanding the
biological system. The original example focuses only on the nodes of the
network and their weights, and the resulting dispositions. While such an ap-
proach shows promise when solving certain problems in the field of artificial
intelligence, the same characterization of a network is too detail deficient to
capture many important features of the brain. Unlike the neural networks
featured in the original example, empirical research on mental mathematics
suggests that we can isolate subsystems such as those grounding working
memory from other subsystems grounding one’s arithmetical competency.
In short, there are empirical grounds for the conclusion that we are the
sorts of beings for whom the distinction between competence and perfor-
mance can be applied. This, in turn, provides materials needed for answering
the ignorance problem as it arises for abstracting models.
19Kowalenko’s (2009) point is made as part of his defense of idealizations from Kripke’s
assaults. On the basis of our being able to isolate our dispositions to add from other
(interfering) factors, he argues that it is reasonable to allow for casual continuity between
the dispositions of actual and idealized objects. While this point is easily generalized to the
use of other models in scientific practice, it is unclear whether Kowalenko’s case for using
idealizations avoids the charge of circularity raised by Kripke. While Kowalenko’s principal
focus is on Kripke’s charge involving the fantastical assumptions made by idealizations,
Kowalenko’s prospect of addressing Kripke’s other charge depends on invoking simplicity
considerations which have been brought into question elsewhere (e.g., Kripke 1982, 38;
Miller 2002, 10, note 16). Whether or not Kowalenko’s use of simplicity ultimately proves




In summary, the basic shape of a solution to the finitude problem is estab-
lished here. The Blackburn-Tennant-Cogburn approach seems to get this
much right: we can only expect of an agent that they be competent with
terms on the basis of dispositions to complete feasible tasks. But for all
of its appeal, this approach faces two special cases of the finitude problem.
The motivating insight of the position is preserved, though, by invoking ab-
stracting models. The picture presented here—the result of fusing the two
approaches—provides the basic framework for saying how a finite agent can
intend a meaningful expression with indefinite (or even infinite) applications,
and it does so by permitting itself only naturalistically respectable materials.
Not surprisingly, then, the position passes off settling some details to empir-
ical inquiry; but here the basic materials required to answer the meaning
sceptic have been put in place. It remains to supplement the present account
so as to avoid other traditional objections to semantic dispositionalism.∗
References
Blackburn, S. 1984, “The Individual Strikes Back”, Synthese 58, pp.
281–302
Boghossian, P. 1989, “The Rule-Following Considerations”, Mind 98, pp.
507–549
Cartwright, N. 1989, Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement, Oxford:
Clarendon Press
Chakravartty, A. 2001, “The Semantic or Model-Theoretic View of The-
ories and Scientific Realism”, Synthese 127, pp. 325–345
Chierchia, G. and McConnell-Ginet, S. 2000, Meaning and Grammar:
An Introduction to Semantics, second edition, Cambridge: The MIT Press
Chomsky, N. 1965, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge: The MIT
Press
∗I am grateful to Joseph Baltimore, Nicholaos Jones, William Melanson, Neil Tennant,
Joshua Smith, and four anonymous referees for providing extremely helpful comments
leading to the final version of this article.
20
Coates, P. 1997, “Meaning, Mistake and Miscalculation”, Minds and Ma-
chines 7, pp. 171–197
Cogburn, J. 2004, “Inferentialism and Tacit Knowledge”, Behavior and
Philosophy 32, pp. 503–524
Cresswell, M.J. 1978, “Semantic Competence”, in: F. Guenthner and M.
Guenthner-Reuter, eds., Meaning and Translation. London: Duckworth
Ducheyne, S. 2007, “Abstraction vs. Idealization”, The Reasoner 1(5), pp.
9–10
Fodor, J. 1990, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, MIT Press: Cam-
bridge
Haukioja, J. 2004, “Kripke’s Finitude Objection to Dispositionalist Theo-
ries of Meaning”, in: J. Marek and M. Reicher, eds., Experience and Anal-
ysis. Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg
am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
Jones, N. 2008, “Is All Abstracting Idealizing?”, The Reasoner 2(4), pp.
4–5
Kripke, S. 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press
Kowalenko, R. 2009, “How (Not) To Think About Idealisation and Ceteris
Paribus-Laws”, Synthese 167, pp. 183–201
Kusch, M. 2005, “Fodor v. Kripke: Semantic Dispositionalism, Idealization
and Ceteris Paribus Clauses”, Analysis 65(2), pp. 156–63
Kusch, M. 2006, A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules, Ithaca: McGill-
Queen’s University Press
Larson, R. and Segal, G. 1995, Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction
to Semantic Theory, Cambridge: The MIT Press
Liu, C. 1999, “Approximation, Idealization, and Laws of Nature”, Synthese
118, pp. 229–256
21
Martin, C.B. and Heil, J. 1998, “Rules and Powers”, Nouˆs 32(12), pp.
283–312
Miller, A. 1997, Philosophy of Language, London: UCL Press
Miller, A. 2002, “Introduction”, in: A. Miller and C. Wright, eds., Rule-
Following and Meaning. London: UCL Press, pp. 1–15
Pettit, P. 1999, “A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions”, Philosophical
Studies 96, pp. 21–44
Pietroski, P. andRey, G. 1995, “When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving
Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity”, The British Journal for the Philoso-
phy of Science 46(1), pp. 81–110
Podlaskowski, A. 2010, “Reconciling Semantic Dispositionalism with Se-
mantic Holism”, Philosophia 38, pp. 169–178
Podlaskowski, A. and Jones, N. 2012, “Idealizing, Abstracting, and
Semantic Dispositionalism”, European Journal of Philosophy 20(1), pp.
166–178
Sprevak, M. 2008, “Kripke’s Paradox and the Church–Turing Thesis”,
Synthese 160, pp. 285–295
Suppe, F. 1989, The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Real-
ism, Chicago: University of Illinois Press
Tennant, N. 1997, The Taming of the True, New York: Clarendon Press
22
